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Abstract
It is commonly claimed, both by physicists and philosophers that
the universality of critical phenomena is explained through particular
applications of the Renormalisation Group (RG). This paper seeks to
clarify this explanation.
The derivation of critical exponents proceeds in two ways: (i) via
a real-space and (ii) via a momentum-space application of the RG.
Following Mainwood (2006) I argue that these approaches ought to
be distinguished: while (i) fails adequately to explain universality, (ii)
succeeds in the satisfaction of this goal.
(i) depends on various extensions to the Ising model. These serve
as archetypes of the different universality classes. I emphasise that the
derivation does not take diverse systems and justify their inclusion in
each universality class, rather universality is assumed and the critical
exponents are obtained for each class from its archetype alone.
(ii) starts with an effective Hamiltonian which abstracts away from
the details of different physical systems. It can be shown that the ad-
dition of various operators to this Hamiltonian would be irrelevant
to the derived values of the critical exponents; this implies that mul-
tiple Hamiltonians belong to the same universality class. As such,
universality is explained by the general applicability of the effective
Hamiltonian.
I further claim that we have good reason to believe that a reductive
explanation of universality could be formulated; this follows from the
explanatory strategy clarified in previous sections. I argue that the
possibility of a reductive explanation undermines claims in Batterman
(2014) and Morrison (2014) that the RG explanation of universality is
irreducible. In addition, this may provide a paradigm example of a
reductive explanation of multiple realisability.
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1 Introduction
‘Universality’ is the technical term for a striking kind of multiple realisabil-
ity. Physical systems exhibit phase transitions: abrupt variation in macro-
scopic behaviour such as the transformation from water to steam. For flu-
ids, such clearly defined liquid-gas transitions happen only below a certain
temperature known as the critical point. Above that temperature there is
no clearly defined transition.
The universality in question corresponds to the behaviour of systems
as they approach this critical point. It turns out that such behaviour can
be very well described by power laws of the form ai(t) ∝ tα where t is
proportional to the temperature deviation from the critical temperature.1
The striking phenomenon is that physical systems can be categorised into
universality classes according to their behaviour as they approach the criti-
cal point: members of the same class have identical critical behaviour – the
1E.g. the specific heat (c) scales as c ∼ α−1(t−α) as T → Tc and B = 0. t = T−TcTc .
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same set of critical exponents {α, β, ...} for several power laws – while they
may have radically diverse microphysical structures.
A paradigm example of universality is that the liquid-gas critical phase
transition and the (uniaxial) ferromagnetic-paramagnetic critical phase tran-
sition share critical exponents. Both of these types of systems may be de-
scribed by equivalent power laws as they transition from certain ordered
states (liquid or magnetised respectively) to critical states. These systems
are examples of the 3D Ising universality class.
Hundreds of papers have been published in Physics journals over the
last fifty years on this topic. On the one hand a great deal of experimen-
tal evidence is available which classifies many different physical systems
into a few universality classes, and finds the critical exponents for these
classes to ever greater accuracy; see Sengers and Shanks (2009) and refer-
ences therein. On the other, theoretical work is continually under way to
refine and develop the theoretical models for each universality class; see
Pelissetto and Vicari (2002). It is now the case that both through computer
modelling (Monte Carlo simulations) and through field-theoretic deriva-
tions (using perturbation theory) critical exponents derived match very
closely those discovered empirically.
How is universality to be explained? This question generalises to de-
bates concerning the explanation of multiply realised phenomena: how
ought one to explain instances of common behaviour between systems
which have diverse microstructures? A standard response is that we ought
to discover the features of such systems which are sufficient for such be-
haviour. If those features are shared between the various systems then we
have an explanation of the common behaviour, if not one ought to conclude
that the common behaviour is coincidental.2
Batterman (2014) asserts that an adequate explanation of universality
must show how heterogeneous features are irrelevant. This demand is
clearly satisfied by the identification of common features sufficient to de-
rive the common phenomenology. If details are identified sufficient for
some behaviour to occur then other aspects of the system under consider-
ation will be irrelevant to that occurrence. The discovery of sufficient com-
mon features is thus the standard for an adequate explanation to which I
appeal throughout this paper.
2Some instances of apparent commonality might fail to qualify as true instances of com-
monality, in such situations the coincidence will not be surprising.
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In the following I outline the background physics (§2) and analyse the
explanation on offer by the momentum-space and the real-space approaches
to the Renormalisation Group (RG); see §3.1 and §3.2 respectively.3 In the
physics literature it is standard practice to distinguish these approaches; I
will argue, following Mainwood (2006) that the distinction is also signifi-
cant when assessing the RG explanation of universality. I, like Mainwood,
endorse the momentum-space explanation of universality while arguing
that the real-space explanation is generally inadequate. However, my rea-
sons for believing this are quite different from those adduced by Main-
wood.
The distinction between these explanatory approaches and the adop-
tion of the momentum-space approach implies that each member of each
universality class is distinguished by a set of ‘irrelevant operators’. This
has the consequence that, contra the primary claims of Batterman (2014)
and Morrison (2014) a reductive explanation of universality is available;
see §4.1.4
Close attention to the physics thus has a philosophical pay-off: a schema
is outlined for deriving the momentum-space RG explanation from the mi-
croscale Hamiltonians ascribed to each individual system. This will be of
interest to philosophers with a stake in the emergence-reduction dialectic.
Batterman (2014) argues, pace Sober (1999), that universality does in fact
pose a challenge to reductionism; in §4 I outline the philosophical dialectic.
Batterman’s argument rests on the claim that an explanation of universality
(which he regards as a paradigm example of multiple realisability) is un-
available. As such, my claims here are of central relevance to that debate.
2 The Physics
The following two sections involves some technical detail. What do I show
in non-technical terms? That the two approaches to the RG provide differ-
3Although more generally momentum-space and real-space depictions are equivalent –
simply related by a Fourier transform – in the current context these are labels used to refer
to different derivations of the critical exponents.
4This involves the bracketing of claims about the emergence implied by the infinitary
idealisations which are appealed to in the renormalisation group account of critical phe-
nomena; although I do not think that this issue has been satisfactorily resolved, discussion
may be found in Batterman (2005), Butterfield and Bouatta (2011) and Callender and Menon
(2013).
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ent putative explanations of universality and that, as such, they ought to
be distinguished.
I conclude that the real-space approach allows for the derivation of uni-
versality based only on a representative model for each universality class.
A model is not provided for each member of the same class and it is not
demonstrated that the details which distinguish each member of the same
class are irrelevant to that system’s critical behaviour. Thus universality is
not explained but assumed: no justification is given for the application of the
single model to the other members of the class. This conclusion is reached
through consideration of the models and a sketch of the RG methods by
which the critical exponents are derived for each such model.
In §3.2 I consider a possible response to this assumed-not-explained ob-
jection: this involves the claim that liquid-gas systems and uniaxial mag-
netic systems have common behaviour because of a structural mapping
(the lattice-gas analogy) between them. I express doubts about this reason-
ing, in addition I argue that the behaviour of the broad range of systems
which feature universality is not thus explained.
I also describe the momentum-space RG approach. I argue that only the
momentum-space RG (because of its use of a renormalisable Hamiltonian)
has the tools to describe the commonalities in the various systems sufficient
to their common behaviour. This explanation proceeds via demonstration
of the genericity of the Hamiltonian under consideration. But this expla-
nation is somewhat different to the explanatory sketch on offer in some
physics and philosophy texts. The standard account implicitly depends on
physics which has not been worked out, as such it includes certain tech-
nical lacunae. In §3.1 I make these lacunae explicit and adduce reasons to
consider the momentum-space RG explanation nonetheless adequate.
The momentum-space explanation of universality identifies a particular
Hamiltonian description which applies to all systems within the same class,
and thus via the use of RG methods derives their critical exponents. The
explanation depends on the demonstration that this Hamiltonian applies
to these various systems (the common feature) and the RG methods. This
grounds Batterman’s (2000,2014) claim that the explanation relies on the
behaviour of the Hamiltonians around the fixed point and relates it to the
underlying description of these physical systems.
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2.1 The Models
It turns out that the critical behaviour of the different universality classes
can be derived from a range of simple model systems. I briefly describe the
Ising model, and its extension to the n-vector model which defines a broad
range of models classified according to their values for two variables. This
model is crucial to understanding the real-space RG, and is abstracted to
provide the basis for the momentum-space RG. Microphysical models are
not defined for multiple members of the same universality class, rather a
representative model is used for each class.
Martin Niss (2005) describes the early history of the Lenz-Ising model.5
This history demonstrates that the Ising model was specifically designed to
represent the physical characteristics of magnetic systems rather than the
broader range of systems which display critical phenomena. Niss observes
that it was commonplace in the 1920s to model magnetic materials as com-
posed of a lattice of numerous micromagnets – often idealised as compass
needles – which mutually interact. The model was proposed to represent
the transition between the ferromagnetic and paramagnetic states of certain
materials.6 The major innovations due to Lenz and Ising were to define a
particular interaction between neighbouring micromagnets and to restrict
their possible orientations to a discrete range. This latter assumption arose
out of a combination of empirical data, knowledge of the structural and
symmetry properties of solid matter and considerations from early quan-
tum mechanics.
In modern formulations the Ising model is described as an array of
spins. It consists of a D-dimensional cubic lattice with {ei} basis vectors
with sites labelled k = (k1e1, ..., kDeD). At each site there is a spin variable
σk ∈ {−1, 1}, though in extensions to this model the spin variable can take
a greater range of values. A Hamiltonian is defined:
H = −J
∑
k,k+µ
σkσk+µ −B
∑
k
σk (1)
The coupling constant J takes a positive value and is assumed to be
5I will henceforth refer to it as the ‘Ising model’ – as it is generally known – although
Lenz and Ising jointly proposed it in papers in 1920 and 1924 respectively.
6The Ising model also predicts the spontaneous magnetisation below the critical temper-
ature, though this was not discovered until Peierls did so in 1936.
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independent of all variables other than the system volume. The Ising model
interaction is generally defined over nearest, or next-nearest neighbours,
thus µ is a lattice vector which takes any vector to the relevant neighbour
in the positive direction. B is an external magnetic field.
The Hamiltonian of a system corresponds to the energy of the system
in a particular configuration, thus we see (as the phenomenology suggests)
that the Ising Hamiltonian will take a lower value when the spins are aligned,
and a higher value when spins are disordered. The ferromagnetic-paramagnetic
transition can be defined over this lattice as the transition from the spin
configuration with all spins aligned to that where there is no general cor-
relation between the spin directions. This transition will take place at the
Curie temperature (Tc). In 1944 Lars Onsager published a paper which de-
rived the specific heat of a two dimensional Ising model in the absence of
an external magnetic field. He demonstrated that this system will display
power law behaviour with a particular critical exponent. However, despite
much effort, no-one has succeeded in an analytic derivation of critical be-
haviour for any three dimensional model.
Behaviours characteristic of systems approaching Tc are termed ‘critical
phenomena’ and it is with respect to the power laws which describe such
behaviour that universality can be observed. Current mathematical proce-
dures to describe such behaviour involve the Renormalisation Group (RG)
which I describe below. First I note the n-vector model which generalises
the Ising model to various universality classes. As Stanley (1999, p. S361)
notes: “empirically, one finds that all systems in nature belong to one of a
comparatively small number of such universality classes”.
The n-vector model includes spins which can take on a continuum of
states.
H(d, n) = −J
∑
k,k+µ
σk · σk+µ −B
∑
k
σk (2)
Here, the spin σk = (σk,1,σk,2, ...,σk,n) is an n-dimensional unit vector.
The two parameters which determine the universality class are the system
dimensionality d (which will determine the set of nearest neighbours) and
the spin dimensionality n. The standard, 3D Ising model corresponds to
H(3, 2).
I now turn to a discussion of the renormalisation group derivation of
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critical exponents. A full exposition would require more space than we
have here but I sketch the procedure below.7 RG transformations are con-
structed to preserve thermodynamical properties of the system of interest
(those derived from the partition function) while increasing the mean size
of correlations. Thus, for example, the RG transformations take a ferromag-
netic system towards the critical point (where the order parameter fluctu-
ates wildly).
2.2 Momentum-space and Real-space Renormalisation
I mentioned above that there are competing methods for deriving the criti-
cal exponents for each universality class. These correspond to different RG
approaches:
Real-space RG: Consider the Hamiltonian of a system on a lattice (e.g.
in the Ising model). The higher energy interactions will probe the structure
of the lattice, and in order to consider the system probed at a larger length-
scale, we average over the higher energy contributions to the Hamiltonian.
This can be done by increasing the effective lattice size and constructing
a new Hamiltonian for a system on a larger lattice, see figure 2; this is
sometimes referred to as ‘coarse-graining’ or ‘zooming out’. This can be
thought of as a blocking procedure, whereby some group of particles is re-
placed by one particle which represents the group through an average or
suchlike.8 On this model the RG flow represents the changes in parameters
which leave the form of the Hamiltonian, and certain qualitative properties
of the system unchanged (i.e. those which are derived from the partition
function) while increasing the lattice size. Monte Carlo computer based
methods allow for the derivation of the critical exponents from the n-vector
Hamiltonian (equation (2)) via the real-space RG.
Momentum-space RG: The Hamiltonian (equation (7)) considered in
this case is more abstract (technically it is a functional of the order param-
eter) and depends for its construction on Ising-type models – I discuss its
derivation below. The calculation of this Hamiltonian for real systems in-
volves integration over a range of scales and energies. The highest energy
(smallest scale) cut-off (denoted Λ) corresponds to the impossibility of fluc-
tuations on a scale smaller than the distance between the particles in the
7There are many textbooks and review articles which describe these techniques, see for
example Binney et al. (1992), Cardy (1996) and Fisher (1998).
8A variety of acceptable blocking methods are discussed by Binney et al. (1992).
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physical system. The RG transformation in this case involves decreasing
the cut-off, thus increasing the minimum scale of fluctuations considered.
This procedure is analogous to increasing the lattice size and will similarly
generate a flow through parameter space designed to maintain the Hamil-
tonian form and qualitative properties of the system in question.9
At this stage I go into slightly more detail, the aim being to provide a
clear sketch of the derivation of the critical exponents for each approach.
The RG transformationR transforms a set of (coupling) parameters {K} to
another set {K ′} such that R{K} = {K ′}. {K∗} is the set of parameters
which corresponds to a fixed point (FP), defined such that the RG transfor-
mation will have no effect on the set of parameters transformed, as such
R{K∗} = {K∗}. If we assume thatR is differentiable at the fixed point this
leads us to a version of the RG equations.
K ′a −K∗a ∼
∑
b
Tab(Kb −K∗b ) (3)
where Tab =
∂K ′a
∂Kb
∣∣∣
K=K∗
There are now two more steps before we can define relevance and irrele-
vance. Firstly we define the eigenvalues of the matrix Tab as {λi} and its left
eigenvectors as {ei}. Now we can define scaling variables which are linear
combinations of the deviations from the fixed points: ui ≡
∑
a e
i
a(Ka−K∗a).
By construction these scaling variables will transform multiplicatively near
the fixed point such that u′i = λ
iui. The second (trivial) step is to redefine
the eigenvalues as λi = byi where b is the renormalisation rescaling factor
and yi are known as the renormalisation group eigenvalues.
If yi > 0 then ui is relevant; if yi < 0, ui is irrelevant; and if yi = 0,
ui is marginally relevant. The relevant scaling variables will increase in
magnitude after repeated RG transformations while the irrelevant scaling
variables will tend to zero after multiple iterations. (The behaviour of the
marginal scaling variables requires more analysis to determine.) Thus,
given the Hamiltonian of one of our models one can define an RG trans-
formation which will allow one to: (i) classify certain of the coupling pa-
rameters of the system in question as (ir)relevant to its behaviour near the
9A note on terminology: the momentum-space RG is so-called because the field-theoretic
calculations involving diagrammatic perturbation theory are most easily performed in
momentum-space, see Binney et al. (1992).
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fixed point, (ii) extract the critical exponents from the scaling behaviour
near the FP. Up to this point the description is generic.
The real-space RG depends on the application of a blocking transfor-
mation as depicted in figure 2 (p.18). It is required that the Hamiltonian
form is stable across these transformations. Since the Hamiltonians are not
renormalisable this involves the application of a transformation and subse-
quent truncation of the Hamiltonian.10 This procedure is generally carried
out using computer methods.
The momentum-space RG approach derives the critical exponents us-
ing diagrammatic perturbation theory which I do not have space to elabo-
rate here. The Hamiltonian in this context is macroscopic and depends on
the order parameter (φ) which – in the Ising model context – is a sum of
the spins in a small region of volume δV at x: φ(x) = µδV
∑
i∈δV σi.
11 We
require that a  δV  l where a is the physical lattice spacing and l is
the dominant statistical length (often the correlation length). One can ap-
proach its construction from the Ising model as follows (see Klein, Gould,
and Tobochnik (2012) for more details):12
Start with the Ising model (equation (1)); then postulate a form for the
Helmholtz free energy F(φ) of a system in contact with a heat bath. The
terms in equation (4) correspond (a) to the interaction of the coarse grained
Ising spins with an external magnetic field, (b) the interactions between
10It is these truncations which motivate Mainwood (2006)’s dismissal of the explanation
on offer by the real-space RG. I discuss this further on p.13. See §3.2 for my distinct critique
of the real-space RG explanation.
11The symbol φ is used to refer to the thermal average of the order parameter φ(x, t).
This quantity has a system-dependent definition. For example in liquid-gas transitions
φ(x) ≡ ρ(x) − ρgas(x) where ρ(x) is the average density in a volume centred on x i.e. is a
fluctuating quantity and ρgas(x) is the time-averaged density for the gas at the temperature
at x. Clearly, below Tc for gaseous systems and above Tc in general φ ≈ 0, but below Tc
for liquid systems φ > 0. Analogously at the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic transition, where
the magnet is well modelled by the Ising model the order parameter is as defined above.
Thus for ferromagnetic systems (at T < Tc) φ 6= 0 and for paramagnetic systems (T > Tc)
φ = 0.
The order parameter is defined for many other systems: for the binary fluid φ(x) =
X ′(x)−X ′′ whereX ′(x) is the local molar density of one of the fluids andX ′′ its thermally
averaged value when the fluids have separated; for Helium I - Helium II transitions the
order parameter is ψ(x) which is the quantum amplitude to find a particle of He II at x;
similarly for conductor-superconductor transitions where ψ(x) is the quantum amplitude
to find a Cooper pair at x.
12There are many different derivations of this Hamiltonian which speaks to its generality.
See Binney et al. (1992), Goldenfeld (1992) for some alternatives.
10
the coarse grained spins which depends only on the distance between the
blocks and (c) an approximation of the entropy (using Stirling’s approxi-
mation). F = U − TS.
F(φ) = −
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
B
∫
φ(x)dx−
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
∫∫
J(|x− y|)φ(x)φ(y)dxdy
− kBT
(∫
[1 + φ(x)] ln(1 + φ(x))dx+
∫
[1− φ(x)] ln(1− φ(x))dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
)
(4)
Assuming φ(x) is small allows the logarithms to be expanded and trun-
cated after the second order (on the assumption that the spin blocks only
vary significantly over large distances). Using Parseval’s theorem, expand-
ing J(|x− y|) in Fourier space, truncating after the second derivative, con-
verting back to real-space and then integrating by parts leads to (b) becom-
ing
Jˆ(0)
∫
φ(x)φ(x)dx+
1
2
R2
∫
[∇φ(x)]2dx (5)
This results in a modified version of equation 4:
F(φ) =
∫
dx[R2[∇φ(x)]2 + φ2(x) + φ4(x)−Bφ(x)] (6)
This is the Landau-Ginzburg free energy, where R2 ∝ ∫ x2J(|x|)dx.
This has the same form as the Landau-Ginzburg-Wilson (LGW) Hamilto-
nian (equation (7)).13 I will not discuss the few remaining steps as the phys-
ical underpinnings have been outlined. The form changes only slightly
when it is read as a functional integral and the system is considered in the
absence of an external magnetic field (B = 0). The integral is generalised
to dimension d.
H =
∫
ddx
[1
2
ζ2|∇φ(x)|2 + 1
2
θ|φ(x)|2 + 1
4!
η|φ(x)|4
]
(7)
Note however that the LGW Hamiltonian is not the Ising model ef-
fective Hamiltonian. This latter object is more complicated, however it is
13In Statistical Mechanics F = Tr{He−βH}
Z
= 〈H〉 .
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demonstrated in Binney et al. (1992, Appendix K), (and is plausible given
its derivation) that equation (7) is a good approximation to a truncated form
of the Ising Hamiltonian near the critical point.
The construction of equation (7) is quite different from equations (1-
2). It builds on these models but abstracts from them. More details can
be found in (e.g.) Fisher (1974). There he demonstrates the field theoretic
methods which allow one to derive expressions for the critical exponents as
functions of d and n, see equation (8) for the first few terms of the exponent
α; this will give a value for various universality classes. This derivation
depends on the functional integration of the LGW Hamiltonian over all
functions φ(x).
α =
4− n
2(n+ 8)
(4− d) + (n+ 2)
2(n+ 28)
4(n+ 8)3
(4− d)2 + ... (8)
Crucially, it can be shown that the addition of certain terms to the LGW
Hamiltonian will lead to irrelevant contributions which do not affect the
values for critical exponents describing the approach to a given fixed point.
In Binney et al. (1992, Ch.14) the criteria for relevance and irrelevance are
derived. An operatorOp is relevant if p−d(p−2)/2 > 0 and irrelevant if p−
d(p−2)/2 < 0 where d is the dimension of the system under investigation.14
Op specifies the power of φ under consideration. It is formally defined as
follows:
Op ≡
∫
ddxλp
p/2−1∑
m=0
(−1)m Cm
(p− 2m)!φ
p−2m (9)
where Cm ≡ 1
2mm!
(∫ Λ ddq
ζ2q2
)m
This serves to establish that for the LGW Hamiltonian, for d = 3, any
Op with p > 6 will be irrelevant at the appropriate fixed point.15 This is an
14Note that the Ising-type Hamiltonians used in the real-space RG approach are not renor-
malisable, as such criteria for relevance and irrelevance of additions to those Hamiltonians
cannot be specified in this generality.
15Odd powers of φ are generally excluded for reasons of symmetry. For d = 3 it can be
established perturbatively (at least to low orders) that O6 is also irrelevant.
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important result for the discussion in the remainder of this paper. Its gener-
ality depends on the justification for the applicability of the LGW Hamilto-
nian to various models. As we will see in what follows this will depend in
part on the order parameter assigned to each member of each universality
class.
The theory behind this result is relatively involved, but the idea is sim-
ple: the LGW Hamiltonian is renormalisable. This means that applying
an RG transformation to the Hamiltonian will not add terms which cannot
be absorbed into the parameters ζ, θ, η in equation (7) (by contrast the real-
space RG will need to be truncated after each RG transformation). Thus the
Hamiltonian is in some sense scale-invariant: its renormalisability means
that it is independent of the details of the cut-off (Λ). The fixed point –
which describes the location of the critical phase transition – is itself a point
of scale invariance as it is unaffected by RG transformations.16 Thus at the
fixed point the only elements which are relevant and contribute to the be-
haviour at the fixed point are those in the renormalisable Hamiltonian. All
other terms which may be added to that Hamiltonian will consequently be
irrelevant or marginally relevant (see §3.1).
The next section will explore the extent to which each RG approach can
be considered to explain the universality of critical phenomena.
3 Universality Explained?
Universality is explained if we are able to show that each member of each
universality class has features in common and that those features are suffi-
cient to generate the universal behaviour. In this section I build upon the
details of physics given thus far. I argue that the momentum-space expla-
nation is adequate (§3.1) but that the real-space explanation is inadequate
(§3.2).
My claims here follow those of Mainwood (2006, pp. 152-187) who ar-
gues that the real-space and momentum-space approaches should be dis-
tinguished when assessing the RG explanation of universality. Mainwood
claims that the real-space approach fails to provide an adequate explana-
tion because the RG transformation needs to be tailored to each model un-
16This corresponds physically to the divergence of the correlation length in critical sys-
tems.
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der consideration – which follows from the non-renormalisability of the
Hamiltonians used. As such he considers the real-space approach inad-
equate to the identification of common features between members of the
same universality class.
I suggest that the real-space approach cannot explain universality for
a more basic reason: it fails to model the diverse range of systems which
fall into the same class and thus does not demonstrate a flow of different
systems into the same fixed point; I discuss this further in §3.2. Mainwood’s
claims bolster my own to the extent that even were the real-space RG to
model each distinct system one would still have grounds for doubting the
explanation of universality.
In addition to my worries about the real-space RG, I argue that much of
the literature mischaracterises the momentum-space explanation of univer-
sality: it is commonly implicitly claimed that the explanation demonstrates
the irrelevance of the heterogeneous details of physical systems. E.g.:
The distinct sets of inflowing trajectories reflect their vary-
ing physical content of associated irrelevant variables and the
corresponding non-universal rates of approach to the asymp-
totic power laws dictated byH.
[Fisher (1998)]
Similar arguments can be found in (e.g.) Batterman (2014), Kadanoff
(2013) and various textbooks. Such arguments are often represented pic-
torially, see figure 1. This explanatory sketch implies that we are able to
include irrelevant details of diverse physical systems in the mathematical
representations. However such representations have not been derived for
the systems of interest. On the other hand such derivations are not required
to explain universality. An explanation is adequate if it exposes features
shared by the various systems in the same class, and demonstrates that
such features are sufficient for the common behaviour. In short: the liter-
ature characterisations of the explanation imply that we can write down
irrelevant operators for systems of interest, but we do not know how to do
this.
In §4.1 I employ the possibility (and likely availability) of explanatory
strategies like those to which the literature refers to argue that, pace Batter-
man (2014) and Morrison (2014), a reductive explanation of universality is
achievable.
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Figure 1: The RG flow in the abstract space of Hamiltonians (or, more precisely, the space
of couplings for a fixed Hamiltonian form). Figure from Fisher (1998).
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3.1 Momentum-space RG and Crossover
We have sound theoretical reasons to think that the LGW Hamiltonian rep-
resents a wide range of physical systems. The physical analysis behind this
claim is the renormalisability of the LGW Hamiltonian and the demonstra-
tion that certain classes of operators are irrelevant, as discussed on p.12. As
summarised by Binney et al. (1992, p.366):
to the accuracy of our calculation we have shown that any
three-dimensional physical system whose Hamiltonian can be
written as an even functional of a one-component scalar field
should have the same critical behaviour as the Landau-Ginzburg
model.
Thus we need an additional justification for each system of interest that
its order parameter can be written as a one-component scalar field. Paying
close attention to the order parameter of each system in the same class will
also ground the various assignations of systems to different universality
classes. The order parameter accounts for the symmetry group (i.e. the n of
the n-vector model) and the dimensionality. Defining the order parameter
for a condensed matter system is not a straightforward process. It depends
subtlely on the kind of phase transition the systems undergoes, and which
macroscopic features change at such a phase transition. Footnote 11 pro-
vides some examples of various order parameters.
The question remains: is universality thus explained? That is, have
common features sufficient for common behaviour been identified? The
claim that the momentum-space RG approach explains universality de-
pends on the connection between the generality of the LGW Hamiltonian
and the individual systems to which it applies. This connection is rooted in
the mathematical representation of the various members of the same class,
and the RG demonstration that these representations all share the same
relevant operators. This line of reasoning thus implies the possibility of
representing the features which distinguish such systems.
In order to represent such distinguishing features we must derive op-
erators which are formally irrelevant to critical behaviour. Such operators
are not generally known for systems of interest. But the justification for the
general applicability of the LGW Hamiltonian assumes that they may be
derived, see p.12.
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It is possible to derive a correspondence between certain operators and
the details of physical systems. This, in combination with the minimal level
of detail required to derive the LGW Hamiltonian, provides grounds for
our acceptance of the momentum-space approach’s explanation of univer-
sality. However, the operators for which such a correspondence can be
shown are not irrelevant. These are relevant or marginally relevant op-
erators which are pertinent in physical discussions of crossover phenom-
ena. Nonetheless such correspondences help to establish that operators
may play the required role in the RG explanation of universality.
Systems undergoing crossover display critical behaviour characteristic
of some universality class as they approach Tc, but under repeated itera-
tions of the RG transformations (read: as the temperature moves closer to
Tc) they deviate from that behaviour and cross over to a different universal-
ity class. For example a system near the Heisenberg fixed point may have
an additional relevant operator, we might thus define a Heisenberg type
(n = 3) Hamiltonian including operators for isotropic and anisotropic cou-
plings. It turns out that a system so described will cross over to Ising-type
behaviour; for further details see Fisher (1974) and Cardy (1996).
For most instances of universality we have yet to discover irrelevant
operators which are physically interpreted as representing those features
which distinguish multiple members of the same class. The phenomenon
of crossover does suggest that such differences can be modelled. This in
turn grounds the claim that the momentum-space approach explains the
universality of critical phenomena: it identifies shared features in our sys-
tems of interest (represented by the LGW Hamiltonian) sufficient to predict
their display of the critical exponents. The expanded Hamiltonians with
the irrelevant operators, together with the flow induced by the RG, may be
depicted as in figure 1 and thus explain universality
3.2 Real-space RG and the Lattice gas
The real-space RG may be understood by appeal to simple diagrams like
that in figure 2. It is thus unfortunate that, as I argue in this section, the
explanation provided by the real-space RG is insufficient to account for
universality.
The real-space approach allows for the derivation of critical exponents
consistent with empirical observation for various models. Furthermore we
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Figure 2: This demonstrates a single application of the real-space RG where a block of spins
is replaced by a single larger spin. Figure from Fisher (1998).
have an account of relevance and irrelevance and the claim that: “In gen-
eral, for fixed points describing second-order critical points, there are two
relevant parameters: the temperature and the field conjugate to the order
parameter (for the magnet it is the magnetic field)” (Cheung (2011, p.51)).
Why is this explanation of universality not sufficient?
The problem with the real-space RG approach is that one has first to
assign a model, then apply the RG technique to get to the critical expo-
nents. In general the applicability of the model to each member of the class
is not justified. As such universality is assumed rather than explained: no
common feature has been identified between the diverse members of the
same class. In fact most members are not given a mathematical representa-
tion at all. To relate this to the discussion in the last section: the real-space
RG explanation is lacking because it cannot classify in general terms pu-
tative additions to the n-vector Hamiltonian (equation (2)) as relevant or
irrelevant, and thus cannot justify the claim that the n-vector Hamiltonian
represents features shared by all members of the same class.
The lattice-gas analogy exemplifies a possible mapping which may sup-
plement and render adequate the real-space explanation. However this
supplemented explanation does not explain why liquid-gas systems be-
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have like anisotropic magnets in the critical region but not outside that
region. Furthermore it is not generalisable to other examples of various sys-
tems falling into the same universality class. In both respects the momentum-
space approach outdoes the real-space approach even with the lattice-gas
analogy.
The lattice gas model is summarised as follows:
Consider the Hamiltonian
H = −4J
∑
〈ij〉
ρiρj − µ
∑
i
ρi, (10)
where ρi = 0, 1 depending if the site is empty or occupied, and
µ is the chemical potential. If we define σi = 2ρi−1, we reobtain
the Ising-model Hamiltonian withB = 2qJ+µ/2, where q is the
coordination number of the lattice. Thus, for µ = −4qJ , there
is an equivalent transition separating the gas phase for T > Tc
from a liquid phase for T < Tc.
[Pelissetto and Vicari (2002, p.554)]
This mapping is clear enough, but merely shifts the burden of justi-
fication. As Pelissetto and Vicari acknowledge “The lattice gas is a crude
approximation of a real fluid” (ibid.). Their justification for this approxima-
tion is empirical: “Nonetheless, the universality of the behavior around a
continuous phase-transition point implies that certain quantities, e.g., crit-
ical exponents ... are identical in a real fluid and in a lattice gas, and hence
in the Ising model.” The model is provided the following rationale in the
context of its original presentation:
The question naturally arises as to the relationship between
a lattice gas and a real gas in which the atoms are not confined
to move on lattice points. If one replaces the configurational in-
tegral in the partition function of the real gas by a summation
over lattice sites, one would obtain the partition function of the
lattice gas. Theoretically speaking, by making the lattice con-
stant smaller and smaller one could obtain successively better
approximations to the partition function of the real gas.
[Lee and Yang (1952, p.412)]
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This is rather odd. Although gases may often be modelled as contin-
uum gases, this is itself an idealisation which requires a physical justifica-
tion. Furthermore, the problem with the application of the Ising model to
a physical gas is not that the Ising model is discretised – we expect gases
to contain finitely many particles. Rather one should be concerned that
the molecules have far more degrees of freedom available to them than the
components of uniaxial magnets. The move towards continuum is an ide-
alising step: we sought a de-idealisation to justify the application of the
Ising model to liquid-gas systems.
If we were to accept this justification of the lattice-gas model further
questions would be raised: for magnets and liquid-gas systems do not dis-
play the same behaviour away from the critical point. It is precisely be-
cause the systems behave so differently much of the time that universality
is startling. Thus, even if it turns out that the lattice-gas analogy gives a
good account of liquid-gas systems, additional details are needed to ex-
plain the limited applicability of the Ising model to such systems.17
Do we have an explanation why these different systems undergo sim-
ilar behaviour near the critical point? We are told that most of a system’s
features are irrelevant to its critical behaviour. It turns out, and this is sur-
prising and interesting, that uniaxial magnets and fluids have some be-
haviour which is approximately described by the same model: namely the
Ising model. But this result is a consequence of careful mapping between
the systems; it was not an RG result. While a lattice gas model may explain
universality to some degree, a generalisable RG explanation is not available
on the real-space approach: the RG was used for the derivation of the crit-
ical exponents from the models, not in the justification of the applicability
of the models to various physical systems.18
On the real-space approach we only have an account for what’s in com-
mon between systems with diverse microphysics when we have a well-
motivated mapping between the Ising models and a model for the system
in question. The lattice-gas analogy may provide one such mapping. How-
17Even at the critical point Vause and Sak (1980) argues for a failure of the lattice-gas anal-
ogy: while magnets display a symmetry under global spin inversion (in the absence of an
external magnetic field) which implies a symmetry of the magnetisation-temperature curve
about the temperature axis, liquid-gas systems will not display analogous symmetries of
the density-temperature curve.
18My arguments do not show that the real-space RG is useless, it is very effective at de-
riving critical exponents. However, it does not provide an explanation for the phenomenon
that various different systems manifest the same exponents.
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ever the real-space RG does not allow for a generalised explanation of uni-
versality because it cannot underwrite the flow of various different systems
into the same fixed point.
4 On ‘The Universality Argument Against Reduction-
ism’
So far we have established that the two approaches to the RG ought to
be distinguished because the momentum-space approach provides an ade-
quate explanation of the RG while the real-space approach does not. This
allows me to address a further controversy: can universality be explained
reductively? Batterman claims that a reductive approach lacks the resources
to address the question:
MR: How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typ-
ically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the
macro-scale?
[Batterman (2014, p.8)]
This [RG response toMR] involves mathematical techniques
that do not look anything like reductionists’ conception of deriva-
tion or deducibility. These techniques allow one to show how
details that genuinely distinguish realizers from one another are
irrelevant to the existence of the pattern.
[ibid. p.21]
As we have seen, Batterman considers the renormalisation group ex-
planation of MR to be adequate, however he understands this explanation
to operate exclusively at a level of some abstraction. Batterman claims that
a reductive explanation of universality is unavailable. Similarly Margaret
Morrison accepts that universality can be explained but she believes any
RG explanation to involve the input of information about some scale above
the micro. As such she also, though for slightly different reasons, chal-
lenges the possibility of a reductive explanation of universality:
While a reduction in degrees of freedom is an important goal
[in the context of explaining universality], it is only part of the
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story. The way this reduction is achieved makes apparent how
RG functions not only as a calculational tool but as the source
of physical information as well. The latter is accomplished by
showing how the process relies on the transformation of struc-
tural features of systems (the Hamiltonian in SM, the evolution
map for discrete dynamical systems, etc.) rather than specific
values for microscopic parameters.
[Morrison (2014, p.1155)]
In this section I rebut these claims. I argue that the momentum-space
RG explanation of universality looks to be reducible, and that there is no
good reason to think that such a reduction would fail. Of course, as in most
examples of putative reductions in physics (or science more generally) the
reduction has not been fully worked out, but I offer plausibility arguments
that a reduction is possible based on my claims in §3.1.
Batterman contends that even were physics to provide a complete deriva-
tion of each system’s critical behaviour from the bottom-up, this would not
be sufficient for an explanation of universality. Reductionism is thus, in
the context of universality, challenged quite differently from the challenge
of infinitary idealisations discussed with respect to first order and contin-
uous phase transitions; see e.g. Batterman (2005) and Batterman (2011).19
However, the challenge of infinitary idealisations still remains: arguably
one cannot define the critical point without going to the infinite limit – dis-
cussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Batterman situates the anti-reductionist worries which are presently of
interest in a long running debate in the philosophy of science. He uses
the case of universality to criticise Sober (1999)’s response to Fodor (1974)
and Putnam (1980). Fodor has long argued that multiple realisability – the
higher level commonality of multiple microphysically distinct systems –
cannot be explained reductively. By contrast Sober argues for pluralism
about explanation:
Generality is one virtue that an explanation can have, but
a distinct – and competing – virtue is depth, and it is on this
dimension that lower-level explanations often score better than
19Batterman (2013) also raises a claim to emergence similar to that in the universality
context: there he emphasises that the RG is superior to reductionist modes of explanation
because it takes into account fluctuations and thus operates at the ‘meso-scale’.
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higher-level explanations. The reductionist claim that lower-
level explanations are always better and the antireductionist claim
that they are always worse are both mistaken.
[Sober (1999), p.560]
Sober argues that multiple realisability need not trouble the reduction-
ist. He does so by observing that different kinds of explanation are useful or
applicable to different ends. He observes that adding content to an expla-
nation, e.g. by effecting an explanatory reduction, does not stop its being
an explanation and that reductive explanations will generally be of interest
even if the higher level explanations are adequate in some contexts.
Batterman counters Sober by purporting to provide an explanation which
would be undermined by a reduction: the RG explanation of universality.
He argues that universality is an instance of multiple realisability where
the critical exponents are multiply realised by the various members of their
universality class. He claims that the full explanation of universality nec-
essarily proceeds at the higher level in terms of the flow towards the fixed
point, and that this should be treated as a paradigm explanation of multi-
ply realised phenomena.
As such, Batterman seeks to undermine Sober’s pluralism. It is not that
both lower-level and higher-level explanations will do for understanding
cases of multiple realisability in different contexts. In fact specifically for
certain such cases the higher-level explanations are the only ones which
work; the lower-level explanations fail. This failure of explanatory reducibil-
ity is due to the need to invoke the RG which, in Batterman’s view, must
proceed at the higher level.
In response I claim below that, although the RG methods are complex
and involve both abstractions and change of variables, the explanations
may be seen to derive their impetus from the pairing of physical systems
with microphysically derived Hamiltonians. As such, I reject the claims
of both Batterman and Morrison that the workings of the RG undermine
prospects for achieving the goals of the reductive project.
The upshot of my analysis is that the momentum-space RG does not
bring new information to the microphysical descriptions of physical sys-
tems.20 Rather it is a mathematical tool which brings out existing facts
20However the real-space RG requires the truncation of the Hamiltonians to which it’s
applied and may thus be seen to be a source of information as Morrison suggests.
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about the Hamiltonians to which it is applied. I claim that one ought to
view the momentum-space RG approach – the only approach adequate
to explain universality – as a mathematically complex way of describing
the changes in the micro system. Hence one may view the explanation of
universality as identifying the commonalities between the microsystems
which lead to shared ‘relevant’ variables across diverse systems.
4.1 The Explanation Reduced
Where a higher level explanation of universality is available, each stage of
the explanation can be shown to depend for its validity on the microphysi-
cal description. Even were aspects of the description to remain irreducible,
I claim that those critical to the explanation will be properly understood as
claims about the lower level. As such, I undermine Batterman’s critique
of Sober, and reinstate the possibility that any case of multiple realisability
may be explained reductively.
It was shown above (§3.1) that the momentum-space RG explanation
of universality implies that operators which represent their heterogeneity
could be assigned to each system in the same universality class: the ‘irrele-
vant’ operators. Here I suggest that if such irrelevant operators can be pro-
vided then they will establish the relationship between the microphysics
and the higher level picture and the explanation of universality may be
thus reduced. To that end I recapitulate the explanation I discussed in §3.1.
1. Define the effective Hamiltonian for your system of interest:
(i) Specify the order parameter with symmetry and dimensionality.
(ii) Specify operators in addition to the terms in the LGW Hamilto-
nian.
2. Apply the RG transformations to that Hamiltonian.
3. Examine the flow towards fixed points in the critical region and note
that some operators are irrelevant to the critical behaviour.
4. Thus divide the set of operators into subsets: ‘relevant’, ‘irrelevant’
and ‘marginally relevant’.
5. Repeat for other systems of interest.
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Universality is explained where we identify a commonality among sys-
tems in the same universality class sufficient to account for the appearance
of common features. This commonality is provided by the LGW Hamil-
tonian and the order parameter (1.(i)), but its generality arises from the
irrelevance of those operators which would distinguish different systems
in the same class. As such, if the explanation is adequate then we should,
in principle, be able to derive 1.(ii).
How might we go about reducing this explanatory schema? We need
to translate the macro-level objects into microphysical terms. It will then
be apparent that the facts which ground the explanation of universality are
microphysical facts. In addition the effective dynamics induced by the RG
transformations must be shown not to introduce novel, higher level facts
(pace Morrison). Overall it will be shown (pace Batterman) that the expla-
nation of universality indeed involves deriving facts about each system in
a given universality class from the relevant Hamiltonian.
So there are two stages to this explanatory reduction. Firstly we need
to argue that the effective Hamiltonian is simply an abstraction, akin to a
change in variables and a loss of detail from the microphysical Hamilto-
nian. This effective Hamiltonian should depend upon the features of mi-
croscopic interactions and should not lose details which specify how the
heterogeneous members of the same class differ. Secondly we need to con-
sider the way in which the RG works. Does it bring in new information?
Does it exclusively operate at the abstract level?
The first stage can be achieved by looking at derivations of the LGW
Hamiltonian. There are many of these, of which I sketched just one in
§2.2. There it can be seen that this does depend on features of microscopic
Hamiltonians. As seen in §2.2 the justification for the generality of the LGW
Hamiltonian relies on the demonstrable irrelevance of operators which dis-
tinguish the systems in our universality class.
The irrelevant operators, if they are sufficient to capture the heterogene-
ity of members of the same universality class would confirm our confi-
dence in the explanation of universality. By the same token such operators
would allow the full Hamiltonian to be derived from microscopic details of
the systems in question. As argued above, the explanation of universality
by the momentum-space Hamiltonian implies that such operators could in
principle be written down. This plays a crucial role in providing a reduc-
tive explanation of universality. In order further to establish these results
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one requires knowledge of the irrelevant operators and their microphysical
derivations to be spelt out. Of course I have not presented a reduction of
the physics of universality; but I have argued on the basis of known physics
that such a reduction is possible.
Which common features of the systems of interest ground their similar
behaviour? The relevant operators of the LGW Hamiltonian are shared by
members of the same universality class, in addition the symmetries and
dimensionality of the order parameter represent common features. As can
be seen in footnote 11 each system has a different definition for its order
parameter. The order parameter for the Ising model is defined in terms
of the spins in its microphysical Hamiltonian. Where we have mappings
between the various models, such as the lattice-gas analogy we can define
the order parameter in terms of the microscopic constituents of the system
of interest: where the spins are analogous to occupation number, the sum
of spins over a region of the lattice will represent the local magnetisation
or, analogously, the local density of the system.
But I’ve just criticised the lattice gas analogy (see §3.2), I seem to be hav-
ing my cake and eating it! I criticised the lattice-gas analogy in the context
of the real-space RG approach but I accepted that it may provides the basis
for a limited real-space explanation of universality. A mapping of this sort
is appropriate to the identification of common features between systems
of interest: it grounds the common symmetry and dimensionality of order
parameters in terms of non-trivial similarities of microphysical structure. It
is thus that 1(i) of the momentum-space RG explanation may be reduced.
We have here the sketch of an explanatory reduction. I have shown that
such an explanation is plausible with respect to point 1 of the enumerated
procedure above (p.24).
Before that conclusion can be drawn I ought to discuss the application
of the RG itself. It is here that Batterman and Morrison emphasise the irre-
ducibly abstract nature of the explanation on offer. One might think the RG
explanation must proceed abstractly because it is often described in terms
of a flow through a space parametrised by coefficients of the terms in an
abstracted Hamiltonian. One reads the critical exponents off the change in
values of these various parameters along the lines of RG flow; see figure 1.
Although this presents a nice way of understanding the function of the
RG, the space in question is not essential to the RG itself. “The RG” refers
to a collection of transformations which serve to change the length scale
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of, in this context, the interactions of parts of a physical system described
by a Hamiltonian. As such we can use the RG to understand how various
properties of the system change as the characteristic length scale of fluc-
tuations increases. Consequently we may derive the RG flow towards the
fixed point.
The momentum-space RG apparatus does not, pace Morrison, introduce
novel information into the Hamiltonian of a system of interest. Central to
the RG explanation of universality is the observation that certain properties
of a given system will be relevant and others will be irrelevant to its critical
behaviour. The RG brings out the relations between various physical prop-
erties such as that between the temperature and the correlation length. The
pertinent information is all in the microphysical Hamiltonian from which
the higher level Hamiltonian is constructed.
While this may seem a strong claim, the onus is on those who take the
RG transformations to be more than mere mathematical operations. While
the RG is instrumental in bringing to light commonalities in behaviour of
diverse systems, to claim that this implies a failure of reduction would be
to beg the question.
Morrison’s worry is that the application of the RG involves considera-
tion of a family of systems related one to the other by RG transformations.
Thus the critical exponents are derived from the family of Hamiltonians
rather than from the initial Hamiltonian. While her explication of the RG
is, broadly, in line with claims I have made (though she also fails to distin-
guish momentum-space from real-space approaches), I disagree with Mor-
rison’s analysis of why the RG works. It is not that each increasing length
scale with its own Hamiltonian brings in new information. Rather each
higher scale (renormalised) Hamiltonian may be derived from the initial
Hamiltonian. The momentum-space RG doesn’t bring in new information,
it brings out information about the Hamiltonian: namely the behaviour of
systems as the length scale varies.
The various higher level Hamiltonians plausibly depend on microphys-
ical Hamiltonians. And the RG transformations make apparent structural
features of those microphysical Hamiltonians. The RG transformations
function much like integration: in the former case, presented with a Hamil-
tonian for a system at some temperature the RG transformations may tell
us about physical properties of that system at a temperature closer to the
critical point; in the latter case given a force function for a system at a time
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integration may tell us the velocity of that system at a later time. They are
both mathematical procedures which, though often difficult to carry out,
bring to light facts about some mathematical object of interest.
The arguments in this section seek to establish that the momentum-
space explanation of universality may be reduced at each step. They ad-
vert to a particular deflationary way of understanding the function of the
RG and a hefty promissory note for a deeper theoretical understanding of
the various systems which share universality classes. It is worth repeating
that those who believe that universality is explained at any level by the RG
are also obliged to accept that these technical lacunae can be filled.
5 Conclusion
Batterman characterises the RG explanation of universality as follows:
One constructs an enormous abstract space each point of
which might represent a real fluid, a possible fluid, a solid, etc.
Next one induces on this space a transformation that has the ef-
fect, essentially, of eliminating degrees of freedom by some kind
of averaging rule.
... Those systems/models (points in the space) that flow
to the same fixed point are in the same universality class–the
universality class is delimited–and they will exhibit the same
macro-behavior. That macro-behavior can be determined by an
analysis of the transformation in the neighborhood of the fixed
point.
[Batterman (2014, pp. 13-14)]
This characterisation is representative of the way many physicists and
philosophers discuss universality. In this paper I have demonstrated that
there are details of this picture which have not been worked out. While
we have reasons to be optimistic that these gaps can be filled we ought to
acknowledge that this work has not yet been done. I further argued that
such an acknowledgement will have consequences for our understanding
of the explanation of universality.
I claimed above that there are two ways to cash out this explanation
in terms of the available physics and that these ways differ with respect to
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their success at explaining universality. The real-space approach starts with
a model and derives the critical exponents on the basis of that model. It is
difficult to see how this approach adequately explains the phenomenon
that heterogeneous systems have identical critical behaviour or grounds
the picture of the converging RG flows.
The momentum-space approach, on the other hand, explains universal-
ity by positing an effective Hamiltonian and deriving the critical exponents
from that. That this Hamiltonian is demonstrably general grounds the ex-
planation of universality. Thus the primary moral of my paper is that these
two approaches ought to be distinguished
My arguments for this first moral bring clarity to the structure of the
explanation of universality. This brings me to my second moral: that the
momentum-space explanation of universality may be reduced to a smaller
scale physical description. I argued for this claim by outlining how a re-
duction of the explanation might go and by countering Batterman (2014)
and Morrison (2014). The upshot here is that we have on offer a paradigm
case of multiple realisability which may be given a reductive explanation.
In §4 I briefly outlined the contribution that this may make to an existing
literature.
Further work ought to address other anti-reductionist claims in the con-
text of Batterman’s discussion of critical phenomena. These pertain to the
RG description of the critical region and the fixed point at which certain
values diverge. In addition irrelevant operators ought to be defined which
correspond to properties of real physical systems. This would supplement
the momentum-space explanation of universality and bolster my claim that
such an explanation can be reduced.
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